In this paper we use techniques of Malliavin calculus and forward integration to present a general stochastic maximum principle for anticipating stochastic differential equations driven by a Lévy type of noise. We apply our result to study a general stochastic differential game problem of an insider.
Introduction
In real world, market agents have access to different levels of information and it is important to understand what value particular pieces of information have. This paper is devoted to the study of a class of two-player stochastic differential game in which the players have different information on the payoff. The different agents invest different amounts of capital in order to optimize their utility. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nashequilibria for this game and characterize these for various levels of information asymmetry. The framework is the one of stochastic differential game with anticipative strategy sets.
In the following, let {B s } 0≤s≤T be a Brownian motion and N (dz, ds) = N (dz, ds)−dsν(dz) be a compensated Poisson random measure associated with a Lévy process with Lévy measure ν on the (complete) filtered probability space (Ω, F, {F t } 0≤t≤T , P ). In the sequel, we assume that the Lévy measure ν fulfills Suppose that the state process X(t) = X (u) (t, ω); t ≥ 0, ω ∈ Ω is a controlled Itô-Lévy process in R of the form:
   d − X(t) = b(t, X(t), u 0 (t), ω) dt + σ(t, X(t), u 0 (t), ω) d − B(t) + R 0 γ(t, X(t), u 0 (t), u 1 (t, z), z, ω) N (dz, d − t); X(0) = x ∈ R , i = 1, 2 such that 2) representing the information available to the controller at time t.
Since B(t) and N (dz, dt) need not to be a semimartingale with respect to {G i t } t≥0 , i = 1, 2, the two last integrals in (1.1) are anticipating stochastic integrals that we interpret as forward integrals.
The control processes u 0 (t) and u 1 (t, z) with values in given open convex sets U and K respectively for a.a t ∈ [0, T ] , z ∈ R 0 are called admissible controls if (1.1) has a unique (strong) solution X = X (u 0 ,u 1 ) such that the components of u 0 (·) and u 1 (·, ·) are adapted to the considered filtrations G 1 t t∈ [0,T ] and G 2 t t∈ [0,T ] respectively.
Let f : [0, T ] × R × U × K × Ω −→ R and g : R × Ω −→ R be given measurable functions and the given performance functionals for players are as follows:
f i (t, X(t), u 0 (t), u 1 (t, z), ω) µ(dz)dt + g i (X(T ), ω) , i = 1, 2, (1.3) where µ is a measure on the given measurable space (Ω, F T ) and E x = E x P = E denotes the expectation with respect to P given that X(0) = x. Suppose that the controls u 0 (t) and u 1 (t, z) have the form u 0 (t) = (π 0 (t), θ 0 (t)) ; t ∈ [0, T ] , (1.4) u 1 (t, z) = (π 1 (t, z), θ 1 (t)) ; t ∈ [0, T ] × R 0 .
(1.5)
Let A Π (respectively A Θ ) denote the given family of controls π = (π 0 , π 1 ) (respectively θ = (θ 0 , θ 1 )) such that they are contained in the set of G 1 t -adapted controls (respectively G 2 t -adapted controls), (1.1) has a unique strong solution up to time T and E x T 0 |f i (t, X(t), u 0 (t), u 1 (t, z), ω)| µ(dz)dt + |g i (X(T ), ω)| < ∞, i = 1, 2.
The insider information non-zero-sum stochastic differential game problem we analyze is the following:
Forward integral for B(·)
We recall the forward integral with respect to the Brownian motion. Let B(t) be a Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω, F, F t≥0 , P ), and T > 0 a fixed horizon. if the limit exist in probability, in which case φ is called forward integrable.
Note that if φ is càdlàg and forward integrable, then
where the sum is taken over the points of a finite partition of [0, T ].
Denote by D t the Malliavin derivative in the direction of B(t) and by D B 1,2 the stochastic Sobolev space with the norm · 1,2 given by
See [8] or [17] for definitions and further results.
for almost all t and satisfies
We will denoted by L 1,2 [0, T ] the class of such processes.
We let M B 1,2 be the closure of the linear span of M B with respect to the norm given by
Then we have the relation between the forward integral and the Skorohod integral (see [15, 8] ):
then it is forward integrable and
Using (2.3) and the duality formula for the Malliavin derivative D t see e.g. [8] , one deduces the following result.
5)
where T 0 φ(t)δB(t) denotes the Skorohod integral w.r.t B(t).
Forward integral for N (·, ·)
We give the forward integral with respect to the compensated Poisson random measure N .
Definition 2.5
The forward integral
with respect to the Poisson random measure N , of a càdlàg stochastic function φ(t, z), t ∈ [0, T ] , z ∈ R, with φ(t, z) = φ(ω, t, z), ω ∈ Ω,is defined as
As in the Gaussian case we shall indicate by D N t,z = D t,z the Malliavin derivative in the direction of N and by D N 1,2 the corresponding Sobolev stochastic space, see [8] .
Definition 2.6 Let M N denote the set of stochastic functions φ : [0, T ] × R × Ω → R such that:
We let M N 1,2 be the closure of the linear span of M B with respect to the norm given by
Then we have the following relation between the forward and the Skorohod integrals (see [6, 8] ):
Then by (2.6) and duality formula for Skorohod integral for Poisson process see [8] , we have
3 A stochastic maximum principle for insider stochastic differential games
We now return to Problem 1.1 given in the introduction. We make the following assumptions:
with respect to the arguments x ∈ R, u 0 ∈ U and u 1 ∈ K for each t ∈ [0, T ] and a.a. ω ∈ Ω.
2. For all s, r, t ∈ (0, T ), t ≤ r and all bounded G 2 t -measurable (respectively G 1 t -measurable) random variables α = α(ω) (respectively ξ = ξ(ω)), ω ∈ Ω, the controls β α (s) := 0, β i α (s) and η ξ (s) := 0, η i ξ (s) for i = 1, 2 with
belong to A Π (respectively A Θ ). Also, we will denote the transposes of the vectors β and η by β * , η * respectively.
3. For all π, β ∈ A Π with β bounded, there exists a δ 1 > 0 such that
and such that the family
is λ × ν × P−uniformly integrable and
is P−uniformly integrable. Similarly, for all θ, η ∈ A Θ with η bounded, there exists a
is P−uniformly integrable.
4. For all π, β ∈ A Π and θ, η ∈ A Θ with β, η bounded the processes
exist and follow the SDE, respectively:
. Suppose that for all π ∈ A Π and θ ∈ A Θ the following processes
Now let introduce the general Hamiltonians of insiders. 
defined by
where π = (π 0 , π 1 ) and θ = (θ 0 , θ 1 )
We can now state a general stochastic maximum principle of insider for zero-sum games:
Theorem 3.2 [Maximum principle for insider non zero-sum games]
(i) Suppose ( π, θ) ∈ A Π × A Θ is a Nash equilibrium, i.e.
1.
and
where A is given by (6.21) and B is defined in a similar way.
(ii) Conversely, suppose ( π, θ) ∈ A Π × A Θ such (3.14) and (3.15) hold. Then
are concave, then π, θ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Zero-sum games
Here, we suppose that the given performance functional for Player I is the negative of that for Player II, i.e.,
where E = E x P denotes the expectation with respect to P given that X(0) = x. Suppose that the controls u 0 (t) and u 1 (t, z) have the form (1.4) and (1.5). Let A Π (respectively A Θ ) denote the given family of controls π = (π 0 , π 1 ) (respectively θ = (θ 0 , θ 1 )) such that they are contained in the set of G 1 t -adapted controls (respectively G 2 t -adapted controls), (1.1) has a unique strong solution up to time T and
Then the insider information zero-sum stochastic differential game problem is the following:
Such a control (π * , θ * ) is called an optimal control (if it exists). The intuitive idea is that while Player I controls π, Player II controls θ. The actions of the players are antagonistic, which means that between player I and II there is a payoff J(π, θ) and it is a reward for Player I and cost for Player II. Note that since we allow b, σ, γ, f and g to be stochastic processes and also because our controls are G 1 t -adapted, and G 2 t -adapted respectively, this problem is not of Markovian type and can not be solved by dynamic programming. (i) Suppose ( π, θ) ∈ A Π × A Θ is a directional critical point for J(π, θ), in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ A Π and η ∈ A Θ , there exists δ > 0 such that π + yβ ∈ A Π , θ + vη ∈ A Θ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ) and
has a critical point at zero, i.e.,
where A and B are given as in the previous theorem.
(ii) Conversely, suppose that there exists a ( π, θ) ∈ A Π × A Θ such that (3.27) and (3.28) hold. Then ( π, θ) satisfies 3.26.
Controlled Itô-Lévy processes
The main result of the previous section (Theorem 3.2) is difficult to apply because of the appearance of the terms Y (t), D t+ Y (t) and D t+,z Y (t), which all depend on the control u. However, consider the special case when the coefficients do not depend on X, i.e., when
and θ(t, x, u, z, ω) = θ(t, u, z, ω).
Then equation (1.1) takes the form
We call such processes controlled Itô-Lévy processes.
In this case, Theorem 3.2 simplifies to the following Theorem 4.1 Let X(t) be a controlled Itô-Lévy process as given in Equation (4.2). Assume that the conditions 1-5 as in Theorem 3.2 are in force. Then the following statements are equivalent:
is a directional critical point for J i (π, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ A Π and η ∈ A Θ , there exists δ > 0 such that π + yβ ∈ A Π , θ + vη ∈ A Θ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ).
(ii)
for all α and ξ Malliavin differentiable and all t ∈ [0, T ], where
Proof. It is easy to see that in this case, p(t) = K(t), q(t) = D t K(t), r(t, z) = D t,z K(t) and the general Hamiltonian H i , i = 1, 2 given by (3.13) is reduced to H i given as follows
(i) Performing the same calculation leads to
This means that
Performing the same computation for H 2 , the result follows. This completes the proof for (i).
(ii) The converse part follows from the arguments used in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Zero-sum Game
Under the same hypothesis as given in Section 3.1, if we assume that the controlled process is of Itô-Lévy type, Theorem 3.4 becomes Theorem 4.2 Let X(t) be a controlled Itô-Lévy process as given in Equation (4.2). Retain the conditions 1-5 as in Theorem 3.2. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) ( π, θ) is a directional critical point for J(π, θ) in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ A Π and η ∈ A Θ , there exists δ > 0 such that π +yβ ∈ A Π , θ +vη ∈ A Θ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ) and
has a critical point at 0, i.e.,
for all α and ξ Malliavin differentiable and all t ∈ [0, T ], where 
Some special cases revisited
The results obtained so far are for given general sup-filtrations. To provide some concrete examples let us confine ourselves to particular cases of filtrations which are first chaos generated (see [19] ). This can arise when
• the insider always has information in advance compared to the honest trader. This means that if G t and F t represent the information flow of the insider and the honest respectively, then we have G t ⊃ F t+δ(t) where δ(t) > 0;
• the trader has from the very beginning a particular information about the future (initial enlargement of filtration). This means that if G t and F t represent the information flow of the insider and the honest, then
are e.g. Brownian integrals of deterministic functions.
Let B be one of the following sup-filtrations,
where O is an open set contained in [0, T ]. Then it can be shown (see [19] ) that B i , i = 1, · · · , 3 are the first chaos generated σ-algebras.
From now on we assume that the following conditions are fulfilled:
where L π , M π , L θ , M θ , R π and R θ are defined as in (4.3), (4.4), (4.6), (4.7), (4.5) and (4.8).
Remark 4.3 In [10], a filtration satisfying (C1)-(C3) is called smoothly anticipative filtration.
Theorem 4.4 Suppose that G i , i = 1, 2 satisfied (C1)-(C5). Suppose that ( π, θ) is a directional critical point for J i (π, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ A Π and η ∈ A Θ , there exists a δ > 0 such that π + yβ ∈ A Π , θ + vη ∈ A Θ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ). Then for all
where
Proof. See Theorem 5.7 in [10] .
Corollary 4.5 Assume that the conditions in Theorem 4.4 are in force. In addition, we Proof. Note that X i (t), i = 1, 2 has continuous version and has existing quadratic variation (since B(t) has quadratic variation). By Lemma 2.3 and by assumption, we know that
It follows from condition (C1) that
On the other hand, using uniform convergence on compacts (ucp) in L 1 (P ), we observe that
From the previous arguments, we can deduce the following results
Theorem 4.6 [Brownian case]
Assume that the conditions in Corollary 4.5 are satisfied. Suppose that b and σ do not depend on the controlled process X(·). Set X i t := E B(t)| G i t 0 , i = 1, 2. Let the quadratic variation X i of X i , i = 1, 2 be non-zero. The the following statement are equivalent (i) ( π, θ) is a directional critical point for J i (π, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ A Π and η ∈ A Θ , there exists a δ > 0 such that π + yβ ∈ A Π , θ + vη ∈ A Θ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ).
where L π , M π , L θ , and M θ are given by (4.3), (4.4), (4.6) and (4.7), respectively and where supp d X i denotes the support of the measure induced by the quadratic variation of the process X i , i = 1, 2. In particular, if
are concave, then π, θ is a Nash-equilibrium.
Proof. Note that
We conclude from (4.17) that
The proof follows. 
In addition assume that (C4)-(C5) are valid for M ∈ (t 0 , T ]. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) ( π, θ) is a directional critical point for J i (π, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ A Π and η ∈ A Θ , there exists a δ > 0 such that π + yβ ∈ A Π , θ + vη ∈ A Θ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ).
(ii) .7) and (4.8) respectively. In particular, if
In order to study the case of the initial enlargement of filtration, we need the following Theorem which is based on Theorem 5.8 in [10] :
Theorem 4.9 [Brownian case] Adopting the notation of Section 5.1 in [10] , suppose that G i , i = 1, 2 satisfied (C1)-(C3) and γ = 0. Suppose that ( π, θ) is a directional critical point for J i (π, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ A Π and η ∈ A Θ , there exists a δ > 0 such that π + yβ ∈ A Π , θ + vη ∈ A Θ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ). In addition, we required that E [M θ i (t) G i t − ∈ M B 1,2 and are forward integrable with respect to
for all bounded deterministic functions h 0 (t), where θ 1 = θ, θ 2 = π.
Proof. See Theorem 5.8 in [10] .
It follows from the preceding Theorem and Theorem 5.11 in [10] that
Suppose the conditions of Theorem 4.9 are satisfied. Assume that ( π, θ) is a directional critical point for J i (π, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ A Π and η ∈ A Θ , there exists a δ > 0
where θ 1 = θ, θ 2 = π.
In the next section, we apply our results to model a competition of two heterogeneously informed agents in the market. We particularly focus on a game between the market and the trader. We assume that the mean relative growth rate θ(t) of the risky asset is not known to the trader, but subject to uncertainty.
Application to optimal and competing-insider trading
Consider a financial market with two investments possibilities:
1. A risk free asset, where the unit price S 0 (t) at time t is given by
2. A risky asset, where the unit price S 1 (t) at time t is given by the stochastic differential equation
Here r(t) ≥ 0, θ(t), σ 0 (t), and γ(t, z) ≥ −1 + (for some constant > 0) are given G 1 tpredictable, forward integrable processes, where
is a given filtration such that
Suppose a trader in this market is an insider, in the sense that she has access to information represented by G 2 t at time t (with
. Let π(t) = π(t, ω) be a portfolio representing the amount invested by her in the risky asset at time t. Then this portfolio is a G 2 t -predictable stochastic process and hence the corresponding wealth process X(t) = X (π,θ) (t) will then satisfy the (forward) SDE
By choosing S 0 (t) as a numeraire, we can, without loss of generality, assume that r(t) = 0 (5.6) from now on. Then Equations (5.4) and (5.5) simplify to
This is a controlled Itô-Lévy process of the type discussed in Section 4. Let us assume that the mean relative growth rate θ(t) of the risky asset is not known to the trader, but subject to uncertainty. We may regard θ as a market scenario or a stochastic control of the market, which is playing against the trader. Let A
Θ denote the set of admissible controls π, θ, respectively. The worst case insider information scenario optimal problem for the trader is to find π * ∈ A G 2 Π and θ * ∈ A
where U : R + → R is a given utility function, assumed to be concave, strictly increasing and C 1 . We want to study this problem by using results of Section 4. In this case, the processes K(t),L(t), M (t) and R(t, z) which are given respectively by equations (3.7), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8) become
Therefore Theorem 4.6 and Theorem 4.8 of Section 4 imply the following:
Theorem 5.1 Suppose that σ 0 (t) = 0 and that either
or the quadratic variation of X i (t) = E B(t)| G i t 0 is non-zero, i = 1, 2, (Brownian case). Then there does not exist an optimal solution (π * , θ * ) ∈ A
Proof. Suppose an optimal portfolio exists. Without loss of generality we only consider the first case. Then we have seen that
Choosing t = T and let t 0 ↑ T , we get U (X(T )) = 0, which contradicts our assumption about U . Hence an optimal portfolio cannot exist.
Remark 5.2
The previous result is in accordance with Theorem 1 in [11] , since the Brownian motion is not a semimartingale neither in the filtration B 1 nor in the filtration B 3 .
Theorem 5.3 (Knowing the terminal value of the risky asset) Suppose that σ 0 (t) = 0 G 1 t = F t and G 2 t = F t ∨ σ(S 1 (T )), t ∈ [0, T ] and the coefficients θ(t), σ 0 (t) = σ 0 = 0 and γ(t, z) ≡ 0 are deterministic. Further, require that the conditions (C4)-(C5) hold for M ∈ (t 0 , T ] and that
< ∞ for φ 1 = θ and φ 2 = π.
Then, there does not exist an optimal portfolio for the insider.
Proof. Since S 1 (t) can be written as
One finds that G 2 t = B 2 t . Hence the result follows from Theorem 6.3 in [10] .
Remark 5.4 It can be shown (see [10] ) that Theorem 5.3 also applies e.g to cases, when the terminal value S 1 (T ) is given by max o≤t≤T B(t) or η(T ), where η is a Lévy process.
Application to optimal insider consumption
Suppose we have a cash flow X(t) = X (π,θ) (t) given by
Here θ(t), σ(t) and θ(t, z) are given F T -measurable processes and π(t) ≥ 0 is the consumption rate, assumed to be adapted to a given insider filtration {G t } t∈[0,T ] where
Let f (t, π, θ, ω); t ∈ [0, T ] , π, θ ∈ R, ω ∈ Ω be a given F T -measurable utility process. Assume that u → f (t, π, θ, ω) is strictly increasing, concave and C 1 for a.a (t, ω). Let g(x, ω); x ∈ R, ω ∈ Ω be a given F T -measurable random variable for each x. Assume that u → g(x, ω) is concave for a.a ω. Define the performance functional J by
Note that π → J(π, θ) and θ → J( π, θ) are concave, so ( π, θ) is a Nash-equilibrium if and only if ( π, θ) is a critical point of J(π, θ).
Theorem 6.1 [Optimal insider consumption stochastic differential game consumption I] ( π, θ) is a Nash-equilibrium of insider consumption rate for the performance functional J in Equation (6.2) if and only if
Proof. In this case we have
Therefore ( π, θ) is a critical point for J(π, θ) if and only if
Since X ( π, θ) (T ) depends on ( π, θ), Equation (6.3) does not give the value of π(t) (respectively θ(t)) directly. However, in some special cases π and θ(t) can be found explicitly:
for some F T -measurable random variable λ ≥ 0. Then the Nash-equilibrium ( π(t), θ(t)) of the stochastic differential game (6.2) is given by
Thus we see that the Nash-equilibrium exists, for any given insider information filtration {G t } t≥0 .
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. The proof relies on a combination of arguments of [2] and [10] .
(i) Suppose ( π, θ) ∈ A Π ×A Θ is a Nash equilibrium. Since 1 and 2 hold for all π and θ, ( π, θ) is a directional critical point for J i (π, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ A Π and η ∈ A Θ , there exists δ > 0 such that π + yβ ∈ A Π , θ + vη ∈ A Θ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ). Then we have
We study the three summands separately. Using the short notation
and similarly for
By the duality formulas (2.5) and (2.8) and the Fubini theorem, we get
Changing notation z 1 → z this becomes Taking the limit for y → 0, and using the fact that lim y→0 1 y J 1 ( π 1−y , θ) − J 1 (π, θ) = 0, we obtain that 0 ≥ J 1 (β, θ) − J 1 ( π, θ). Since β can be chosen within the set A π , we obtain by formally setting β = π that J 1 (π, θ) ≤ J 1 ( π, θ) for all π ∈ A π (6.24)
Analogously, we obtain J 2 ( π, θ) ≤ J 1 ( π, θ) for all θ ∈ A θ (6.25) This means that ( π, θ) is a Nash-equilibrium for the market. is concave in each π or θ This complete the proof.
